Abstract-The use of centralized mobility management ap proaches -such as Mobile IPv6 -poses some difficulties to operators of current and future networks, due to the expected large number of mobile users and their exigent demands. All this has triggered the need for distributed mobility management al ternatives, that alleviate operators' concerns allowing for cheaper and more efficient network deployments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing demand of mobile data services from users is no longer a threat to operators, but a reality that needs to be tackled. We are witnessing that the number of wireless mobile subscribers accessing data services does not stop increasing. This is motivated by a variety of different reasons: 3G and WLAN accesses are widely available (combined, coverage reaches almost 100% of dense populated areas in developed countries) and affordable by users (most mobile handsets are 3G and WLAN capable, all laptops and netbooks are equipped with WLAN interfaces, 3G USB modems are quite cheap and operators offer flat rates to their customers). Besides, the number and popularity of applications designed for smart phones that make use of Internet connectivity is getting larger every day, contributing to an increase of market penetration of such devices (e.g., iPhone, Android, Blackberry and Windows Mobile phones), which results in growing demands for Internet connectivity everywhere.
Additionally, operators are migrating their networks to full IP based networks -for both voice and data -triggering a real need for IP mobility management solutions, which up to now had shown little or no deployment penetration. Most of the currently standardized IP mobility solutions, like Mobile IPv6 [1], or Proxy Mobile IPv6 [2] rely to a certain extent on a centralized mobility anchor entity. This centralized network node is in charge of both the control of the network entities involved in the mobility management (i.e., it is a central point 978-1-4577-0248-8/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE 361
for the control signalling), and the user data forwarding (i.e., it is also a central point for the user plane). This makes centralized mobility solutions prone to several problems and limitations, as identified in [3] : longer (sub-optimal) routing paths, scalability problems, signaling overhead (and most likely a longer associated handover latencies), more complex network deployment, higher vulnerability due to the existence of a potential single point of failure, and lack of granularity on the mobility management service (i.e., mobility is offered on a per-node basis, not being possible to define finer granularity policies, as for example on a per-application basis). • Reliability. Centralized solutions share the problem of being more prone to reliability problems, as the central entity is a potential single point of failure.
• Lack of fine granularity on the mobility management service. With current centralized mobility management solutions, mobility support is offered at a user granularity.
This means that the network can just decide if mobility is provided or not to the user, but cannot offer a finer granularity, for example, to allow part of hislher traffic not to be handled by the mobility solution. There are many scenarios in which part or all the traffic of a user does not really need to be mobility enabled, as for example when the user is not mobile (at least during the lifetime of the communication) or the application itself is able to effectively deal with the change of IP address caused by the user movement. In all these situations, it would be more efficient not to enable mobility.
• Signaling overhead. This is related to the previous That is, the first elements that provide IP connectivity to a set of MNs are also the mobility managers for those MNs. In the following we will call these access routers Distributed Anchor Routers (OARs).
Every time a mobile node attaches to a DAR, it gets an
IPv6 address which is topologically anchored at the DAR.
That means that while attached to this DAR, the mobile can send and receive traffic using that address without using any In traditional Mobile IPv6, the communication between the MN and the HA is secured through IPsec [4] . Following a similar approach in FAMA is difficult due to the large number of security associations that would be required, since any gateway of the access network can play the role as home agent for any mobile node. In order to overcome this problem and provide authentication between the DAR and the MNs, we propose the use of Cryptographically Generated Addresses [5] (CGAs), as introduced in [6] . Cryptographically Generated reply to the BU. The procedure is depicted in Fig. 3 . Once the signaling procedure is completed, a bi-directional tunnel is established between the mobile node and the DAR where the IPv6 address is anchored (the "home" DAR -HOARfor that particular address), so the mobile can continue using the IPv6 address, as shown in Fig. 2-(b) .
In case the MN performs any subsequent movements and it requires to maintain the reachability of an address for which it has already sent a BU, the following BU messages can be secured using the PHKT exchanged before, reducing the computational load at the receiving DAR.
Although this approach is attractive because it reduces the signaling overhead generated by the mobility support, it can be misused in some particular scenarios by malicious nodes that wish to export an incorrect CoA in the BU message, since it does not provide proof of the MN's reachability at the visited network. Indeed, the CGA approach assures that the BU message has been sent by the legitimate HoA's owner but it does not guarantee that the same MN is reachable at the provided CoA. In order to provide a more robust solution, we propose a Return Routability procedure similar to the one defined in MIPv6 Route Optimization to mitigate this security issue. The Return Routability procedure starts after the handoff. Instead of sending the BU message, the MN sends a Care-of Test Init message (CoT!). This message is replied by the DAR with a Care-of Test message containing a CoA Keygen Token. The MN can now send a BU using both Home and CoA Keygen tokens to proof its reachability at both the HoA and the CoA. The message and the knowledge of both tokens is a proof that the MN is the legitimate node who has sent the BU and also is reachable at the CoA indicated.
As all security improvements, the one proposed incurs in a 364 performance penalty, in this case an increase in the handover delay. Specifically this enhanced security approach requires four messages to be exchanged between the MN and the DAR instead of the two messages of the original solution. In terms of handover delay, it increases it by a factor of two, as the new solution requires two Round Trip Times (RTTs) to conclude, instead of one.
Note that on every attachment of a node to a DAR, the terminal also obtains a new IPv6 address which is topologi cally anchored at that DAR, and that this address can be used for new communications (avoiding in this way the tunneling required when using an address anchored at a different DAR), as shown in Fig. 2-(c) . A mobile can keep multiple IPv6 addresses active and reachable at a given time, and that requires to send -every time the MN moves -a BU message to all the previous OARs that are anchoring the IP flows that the MN wish to maintain. For instance, in the example depicted in Fig. 2-(d) , the MN sends a BU to the first DAR containing CGA-HoA as home address, while the BU it sends to the second DAR contains CGA-CoAI as home address.
IV. ANALY SI S OF THE SOLUTION
In the following section we focus on conducting a simple analysis of the performance achievable by FAMA, comparing it with the one that would be obtained with plain Mobile IPv6.
The comparison is performed considering the three most important characteristics of a mobility protocol: i) the packet and signaling overhead, ii) the handover delay, and iii) the delay between both communication endpoints. 
A. Overhead Analysis

B. Handover delay
The handover delay corresponds to the time during which an IPv6 address is not usable because of a change of the point of attachment. During this process there are multiple operations performed like the L2 attachment, the movement detection, the address configuration and duplicate address detection, and the mobility signaling. In the following we explain the different components of the handover delay:
• Layer-2 handover time ( TL2 h o ). This time is defined as the time required by the layer-2 technology to perform a handover (i.e., disconnecting from its current point of attachment and connecting to a new one).
• Movement detection time ( TMD ). This delay corresponds to the time required by the terminal to detect that it has moved to a different layer-3 point of attachment.
In IPv6 this can be done in different ways. The most simple (and the one most widely supported) consists in the appropriate use of the Routing Advertisement (RA) messages. An access router periodically multicasts unsolicited RA messages. Movement detection can also be assisted by the use of layer-2 triggers, such the ones implemented by IEEE 802.21. In this case, the movement detection delay can be extremely low.
• IP address configuration and Duplicate Address Detection ( TDAD ). This time corresponds to the configuration of the IP address based on the prefix received in the RA (i.e., the MN uses stateless auto-configuration) and the address uniqueness test in the network.
• Mobility signaling delay. This is the time required to update the mobility anchor (i.e., HA or DAR) with the new location of the MN (i.e., its CoA) and it highly depends on the distance between the entities participating in the user mobility management: the mobile node on the one side and the HAIDAR on the other side.
• Network authentication delay ( Taut h ). The handover de lay also depends on the particular authentication method used in the network being accessed by the user terminal.
Considering these components, we can express the handover delay for plain MIPv6 and FAMA (for the non-enhanced security case) as follows: In order to assess how far and how fast an MN can move,
we perform the following analysis. Lets suppose a VoIP communication between two peers, being one of them an MN using FAMA to handle its mobility. Considering the maximum mouth-to-ear delay as specified in [7] of 150 ms, we can assume that Eq. (2) This means that during the call, the user will walk around 250m, hence performing two handovers and adding a delay of roughly 10ms more than the direct path between the CN and MN. This simple example shows two of the benefits of FAMA: simplicity and low added end-to-end communications delay.
V. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS WORK
The design of flat mobile architectures is becoming a quite hot topic in the IETF and 3GPP, with several solutions already proposed. We next compare FAMA with some of them.
According to [10] and its implementation [11] , mobility support is provided on demand, that is, only for those MNs A description on how to distribute Proxy Mobile IPv6 is given in [14] , in which small Proxy Mobile IPv6 domains form the whole mobility domain. This draft provides a solution to achieve route optimization in several scenarios, at the cost of excessive control messages exchange. Also, the architecture deployment requires a big effort since every small Proxy Mobile IPv6 domain is made of the complete equipment.
Both [15] and [16] propose to use a Distributed Hash Ta ble 
